Touro Law Review
Volume 16

Number 4

Article 13

March 2016

Strategic Evidence Issues in Equal Employment Litigation
Marc Rosenblum

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons,
Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Disability
Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Rosenblum, Marc (2016) "Strategic Evidence Issues in Equal Employment Litigation," Touro Law Review:
Vol. 16: No. 4, Article 13.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/13

This Employment Law Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Rosenblum: Strategic Evidence Issues

STRATEGIC EVIDENCE ISSUES IN EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION
Marc Rosenblum'
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This paper is an update on the changing interpretation of
certain civil rules in Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO")
litigation, primarily some of the rules of evidence, but also the
interplay of those rules and certain rules of procedure. These
changes provide at least some explanation regarding the
increasing extent to which cases are being resolved through
pretrial motions rather than by trial, largely to the detriment of
EEO plaintiffs.
This review selectively covers some intersectional aspects of
evidence law as it applies to employment discrimination law, but
is in no way exhaustive regarding the total body of evidence or
discrimination jurisprudence. Many of the issues covered arise
primarily in class cases, where the key or supporting forms of
prima facie proof involve expert opinions. These opinions
largely rely on statistical inferences regarding groups of
employees or applicants, and require subject-matter expertise as
well as purely quantitative skills on the expert's part.
To proceed with such cases, counsel must first understand
that there is a need to use one or more experts whose opinions
can support those inferences. This whole process is less relevant
to individual EEO claims at the liability stage, where evidentiary
proof is primarily through direct or other circumstantial means
(other than the quantitative, pattern-and-practice approach under
discussion here).
That said, the principles of evidence and EEO law covered
here apply not just to establishing liability, but also to relief,
including the mitigation of damages. As such, it is relevant to all
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strategic evidentiary practices in EEO litigation, individual as
well as class-based in nature.
But once the emerging fact pattern points to the need for an
expert, the customary pretrial framework and strategy applicable
to individual cases - discovery, depositions, motions and the like
- no longer applies. It must now take into account the fact that
all aspects of the expert's opinion must satisfy the revised
intersection of evidence and civil procedure covered here, or risk
summary disposition at any stage.
II. THE CONFLUENCE OF APPLICABLE RULES
A. Evidence
1. Rule 104

--

The "Gatekeeper"

During the seventy years up to 1993, admissibility of
scientific evidence in federal trials was evaluated under a
"general acceptance" standard, under the precedent of Frye v.
United States.2 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharnmaceuticals,3
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion held that because the
Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded Frye, admissibility is
governed by the standards of Rule 702: the expert's testimony
must be based on "scientific knowledge" and must "assist" the
trier of fact. 4

Daubert then held that the trial judge's authority under Rule
104(a) 5 to address witness qualifications generally would also
apply to Rule 702 issues to ensure that juries were not confused
by hired-gun experts peddling junk-science. 6 Hearings on
motions in limine to exclude opposing experts are discretionary
on the part of the trial judge. 7
2 393 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
5 FED. R. EvmD. 104(a).
This rule provides in pertinent part that
"[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a
witness... shall be determined by the court ....

6Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
7 See Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995).

" Id.
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Such motions are mandatory on the part of objectors to
expert opinions, however, and parties who fail to object to an
expert's qualifications or the scientific basis of an expert's
opinion cannot later object to a jury verdict accepting that
opinion.8
Similarly, timely objections are required to preserve
opposition to the admissibility of opposing expert testimony. For
example, a party waives objection to the expert's opinion on
appeal if he or she does not preserve (through proffer) the
objection, even after and aside from a denied motion in limine to
exclude the same expert's opinion. 9 In fact, the Fifth Circuit
held that admission of an expert's unobjected-to testimony was
not plain error by the trial court where, after denial of its motion
in limine to exclude the expert, the challenging party then failed
to object again to the expert's actual trial testimony.' 0
Additionally, the court held that under Rule 103(d)," the crossexamination of the expert during the trial regarding his
qualifications was insufficient itself to preserve for appeal the
objection to the expert's testimony, because it was considered an
attack on the expert's credibility (which must be determined by
the trier of fact), not the admissibility of his opinion.12
Expert challenges under Daubert are now a routine part of
pretrial motion practice. Increasingly, such challenges are linked
to motions for summary judgment to Civil Procedure Rule 5613
" See McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396 (8th Cir. 1994);
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1108 (1997).
9 Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994); see also,
Lindsey v. Navistar Int'l. Transp. Corp., 150 F.3d 1307, 1315, n.2 (11th Cir.
1998) (holding that failure to object to admissibility of expert's qualifications
constitutes waiver of objection on appeal to the expert's testimony and
opinion).
1oMarceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 1997).
" FED. R. EviD. 103(d), provides in pertinent part that "[niothing in this rule
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the court." Id.
12Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), provides in pertinent part that, "[tihe judgement
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings... show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact.... " Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 4 [2000], Art. 13

1302

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 16

whenever the non-moving party's expert is included and there are
no remaining factual issues in dispute that would take the case to
the jury. In Raskin v. Wyatt Co., the court noted that a flawed
expert report is not "a talisman against summary judgment."'14
2.

Rule 702 - Experts

Prior to Daubert, some courts of appeals continued to follow
Frye, while others looked to Rule 70215 to determine expert
admissibility. The split in the circuits aside, there were enough
difficulties in applying Frye consistently so as to invite Supreme
Court review. These problems stemmed from the difficulty in
determining general acceptance in particular scientific fields, and
even more so in those fields' subfields.
Daubert, in effect, shifted these decisions from the scientists
6
and practitioners in the various disciplines to the federal courts. 1
The district court was specifically tasked with closing the gate on
proposed expert testimony that could not satisfy a flexible
admissibility criteria checklist, including whether the expert's
opinion and the underlying facts on which the opinion is based:
*Had been or were capable of being tested;
"Had been subjected to peer-review publication;
"Had a known or potential methodological error rate;
eWas "generally accepted" in the relevant scientific
community responsible for addressing such questions. 17
General acceptance, the sine qua non of admissibility under
Frye, is now only one factor in the mix. Additional criteria were
added by various circuit courts, including:
125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997). See also, Herrero v. St. Louis Univ.
Hosp., 109 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 1997).
15 FED. R. EvID. 702. This rule currently provides in pertinent part: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or othewise." Id. This rule of
evidence, among others, has been amended and took effect on December 1,
2000. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
16 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
17 Id. at 593-94.
'4
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Whether the opinion was expressly developed for
litigation, rather than growing
out of research conducted
18

in a more objective forum;
*

Whether the opinion reflects anything beyond the

expert's pecuniary interest in forensic activity as a
"

lucrative income source;' 9
Whether the opinion considers all relevant factors, or

whether it selectively ignores those variables that could
undercut or invalidate the expert's conclusion.20
Based on the fact pattern of each case, the gatekeeper
determines which admissibility criteria to apply.2 '
The
gatekeeper's decision is reviewed on an abuse of discretion
22
standard.
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,23 the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the trial court's

gatekeeper responsibility in significant respects. First, it rejected
a more stringent "hard look" standard under which appellate
courts could substitute plenary review when the decision to
exclude an expert was outcome-determinative and eliminated the
evidentiary basis of a party's case. 24 Short of clear error, a
gatekeeper decision to admit or reject expert testimony will be
upheld.25

18Rosen

v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
819 (1996); Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84 F.3d 230 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 992 (1996).
19Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996)
(affirming the exclusion of a "professional witness" who was "influenced by a
litigation-driven financial incentive").
20 Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming
exclusion of an expert who "assumed" (at counsel's request) the at-issue
question, and admitted he "didn't address" that problem); Jaurequi v. Cater
Mfg. Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1076, 1083 (8th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert
after he admitted he did not know certain relevant facts and "did not care what
they had said").
2!Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.

n General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
Joiner,522 U.S. at 143.
24 Id.at 141.
21d. at 142.
2
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While Daubert was initially interpreted by some to
distinguish between an expert's scientific principles and
methodology and the conclusions contained in the expert's
opinion (limiting the admissibility determination to an evaluation
of the former), Joiner clarified that the gatekeeper must also
determine if the expert applied an acceptable theory and
methodology to the at-issue facts. 26 If the expert failed to do so,
the opinion was inadmissible as unhelpful to the trier of fact,
rather than admissible subject to later challenge only as to the
opinion's weight.27 Finally, if the "analytical gap" between the
data and the opinion was too great, the trial judge could reject the
conclusion on either or both grounds.28
In completing its admissibility trilogy, the Supreme Court in
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,29 affirmatively resolved the
question of whether Daubert applied to all experts, or only to
those whose expertise was "scientific" in nature. Several circuits
had interpreted Daubert as applying to any opinion derived from
"scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge." 30 Several
other circuits had held that the Daubert test should not be used if
the expert's skill rested on experience and non-scientific training,
or where one or more of the admissibility checklist factors did
not apply, assuming that if certain experts could not be evaluated
on all the criteria, then Rule 702 alone, and not Daubert,
determined admissibility. 31
In Kumho, the Daubert standard*was held to apply to nonscientific expert testimony which requires the trial judge to
"make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
26
27

Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.

28

Id.

526 U.S. 137 (1999).
See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chemical Corp., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998)
(en bane), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999); Peitzmeier v. Hennessey Ind.
Inc., 97 F.3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1196 (1997).
31 See Iacobelli v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994); McKendall
v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997); Compton v. Subaru
of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042
(1996).

29
30
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courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor32that characterizes
the practice of an expert in the relevant field."
Kuhmo impliedly rejected an expansive reading of Rule 702
that favored the broad admissibility of proposed experts on the
theory that their credibility could be tested through crossexamination rather than in pretrial proceedings. 33 The decision
makes clear that gatekeeper scrutiny applies to all proposed
experts, because Rule 702 makes no distinction between the
technical or other specialized knowledge of an expert qualified by
her skill or experience, the expertise gained through graduate
training, and its application in scientific pursuits.
Justice
Breyer's majority opinion also took the opportunity to further
strengthen the trial court's gatekeeper role, reiterating Joiner,
and stated that, in determining the admissibility of nonscientific
expert opinions, the trial judge should look particularly at
whether the method underlying the opinion is generally accepted
by the related expert community, and whether that approach is
prone to producing erroneous results.35
3.

Rule 401 - Relevancy

Relevancy has always been a principal criterion governing
admissibility of any type of evidence, 6 but the interpretation of
what constitutes relevant evidence has been reshaped by the
Daubert/Joiner/Kuhmo trilogy. In Daubert, the Supreme Court
held, first, that the expert's testimony must be reliably rooted in
valid scientific reasoning and methods,37 and second, it must
assist the trier of fact. 38 Expert testimony that is not relevant
32 Kuhmo, 526
33

U.S. at 152.

Id. at 156.

34Id. at 141.
35
1 d. at 152-53.
36 FED. R. EviD. 401.

This rule provides in pertinent part: "'Relevant
Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
37
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
38
id.
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cannot provide such assistance. 39
Daubert characterized
relevance in terms of a "fit" between the expert opinion and the
at-issue facts. 40 This interpretation of relevance, arguably
independent of Rule 401, 4' provides the gatekeeper with 4 2an
enhanced degree of discretion to reject opinions that lack a fit.
The logical outcome of this reasoning also leads to the
exclusion of expert opinions that apply valid scientific principles

incorrectly to a particular fact pattern, and to opinions that rely
43
on faulty assumptions or methods to reach invalid conclusions.
B. Civil Procedure
1. Rule 26 - Discovery
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1993
to require more detailed disclosure of the material and experts
that parties to civil litigation use in the proof process.44 Under

the amended rules, parties are required to notify their opponents
whenever a testifying expert is retained and, within thirty days

thereafter, provide that expert's written report.4 5 The report
must contain the expert's opinion, along with the basis and
39 Daubert, 509

U.S. at 589.

41 Id. at 591.
41 FED. R. EVID. 401. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
42 See Turrentine v. Bell Canada, 173 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1999) (excluding a

proposed expert who failed to establish that his methodology reliably
established causation under the particular facts at issue); Sutera v. Perrier
Group of America, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 655, 662 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that
the expert's theory was unreliable as scientific evidence and did not fit the
facts of the case). See also, 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702-02 (1997).

43 See, e.g., Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 449 (2d Cir. 1999)
(affirming a trial court's ruling that plaintiff's statistical expert opinion was
inadmissible because it was not relevant as required by Rule 401). cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 2688 (2000).
44 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1993) Advisory Committee's
note.
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B), provides in pertinent part that, "with respect
to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony
in the case... [the witness' disclosure shall] be accompanied by a written
report prepared and signed by the witness." Id.
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reasoning underlying that opinion, and a list of the sources and
materials considered by the expert. 46 The expert's qualifications
must also be provided, including a list of the expert's
publications from the previous the past ten years, the rate at
which the expert is being compensated, and most importantly, a
list of all cases within the past four years in which the expert was
deposed or had testified.47
A supplemental disclosure

requirement 4 8 covers instances where the original response is in
some material way incorrect or incomplete.
Non-testifying experts are not subject to Rule 26 disclosure,
since their work product will not be translated into evidence. 49
Non-testifying experts are used primarily to evaluate the opinions

of testifying experts, without risk of their critiques being
discovered.
2.

Rule 37 - Sanctions

One sanction that may be imposed upon parties who violate
Rule 26 is exclusion of the expert testimony in part or in its
entirety.50

The threat of such exclusion promotes increased

46 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(2)(B), providing that "[t]he report shall contain a

complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness in forming
the opinions." Id.
47 FED R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), providing that the report shall also contain "the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the
witness within the preceeding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceeding four
years." Id.
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1), provides in pertinent part that, "[a] party is under
a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals its disclosures. . . if the party
learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or
incorrect." Id.
49 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying
text.

FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), provides in pertinent part that, "[a] party that
without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule
26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use
as evidence at trial ...any witness information not so disclosed." Id. See
supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
50
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compliance, although in practice some courts are reluctant to
invoke the exclusionary provision unless the opposing party
would be substantially prejudiced by admission of the at-issue
material, or where evidence of bad faith non-compliance with the
rule is found. 51
The evidentiary issues affect the use of experts in EEO
litigation. It is important for employment lawyers to recognize
the extent to which discovery and, in particular, the sanctions for
violating the expert discovery process, can affect the evaluation
of opposing expert opinions. This, in turn, directly influences
the decision to seek exclusion of the questionable expert opinion
rather than rebutting it at trial, and the decision to offer the direct
testimony of one's own expert as part of the case-in-chief.
C. Codifying the Gatekeeper Provision
1. Rule 702
Based on recommendations by the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules, the Judicial Conference of the United States
earlier this year approved changes to the Federal Rules of
Evidence that will codify the Daubertgatekeeper provision. Rule
702 presently reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.52
Under the added proviso, the witness will be admitted to
offer expert testimony if:
(1) the testimony is sufficiently based upon reliable facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
See In Re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 792-93 (3d Cir.
1994), (reversing the district court's exclusion decision where the prejudice
was
"extremely minimal."), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995).
52
FED. R. EVID. 702.
51
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the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the
53
case.

By not disapproving, Congress permitted the changes to
become law. 54 As the advisory committee noted:
While the relevant factors for determining reliability will
vary from expertise to expertise, the amendment rejects
the premise that an expert's testimony should be treated
more permissibly simply because it is outside the realm
of science. An opinion from an expert who is not a
scientist should receive the same degree of scrutiny for
reliability as an opinion from an expert who purports to
be a scientist.55
Clearly, the emphasis of the rule change is on the reliability
of the expert opinion, one of the basic Daubert criteria, 56 along
with relevance, which is expressed as assisting the trier of fact.
2. Rule 703
Changes have also been approved in Rule 703, to strengthen
the trial judge's gatekeeper discretion regarding the admissibility
of expert testimony. The Rule 703 change is intended to curb
experts who "slip in" inadmissible evidence into their opinions.57
The Committee explained:
Rule 703 has been amended to emphasize that when an
expert reasonably relies on inadmissible information to form an
opinion or inference, it is the opinion or 58
inference, and not the
information, that is admitted into evidence.

53 As of December 1, 2000, FED. R. EviD. 702 was changed to the language

in the text. See 192 F.R.D. 398 (2000).

54 Chief Justice Rehnquist, by direction of the Supreme Court, brought before

Congress amendments to several federal rules of evidence, among which was
R. Evm. 702. The amendments took effect on December 1, 2000. 192

FED.

F.R.D. at 398.
55 192 F.R.D. at 421.
56

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.

57 192 F.R.D. at 409.
51 192 F.R.D. at 424.
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3. Rule 701
Rule 701 covers the admissibility of testimony by lay
witnesses.5 9 The rule change is intended to block a possible
loophole under which a party could label her expert as a lay
witness to avoid both Daubert and the enhanced version of Rule
702. The Committee stated:
Rule 701 has been amended to eliminate the risk that the
reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 be evaded
through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in
lay witness clothing ...

to the extent that the witness is

providing scientific, technical or other specialized
information to the trier of fact ...

the amendment also

insures that a party will not evade the expert witness
disclosure requirements set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 and
Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 by60 simply calling an expert in the
guise of a lay person.
The Rule 701 change is consistent with the logic of Kumho
in eliminating the distinction between scientific and non-scientific
experts in applying gatekeeper scrutiny.
All experts are
evaluated under one set of uniform standards and criteria, all lay
witnesses under another.
Similarly, prior to Kumho, several courts of appeal had
fashioned their own qualitative supplements to the Daubert
checklist.
Each, in its own way, articulated an inverse
relationship between the expert's reliability and the degree of
gatekeeper scrutiny that the trial court must exercise: experts
relying primarily on their experience (the ipse dixit opinion) must
FED. R. EvlD. 701 presently reads:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact
in issue.
Id.
6o 192 F.R.D. at 416.
59
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explain in more detail the basis of their opinions relative to
experts who simply rely on and apply a scientifically established
methodology. 6 '
MI.APPLYING
THE
RULES
AND
DECISIONS
EMPHASIZING RELEVANCE AND RELIABILITY
TO EEO LITIGATION
Expert analysis of statistical data has historically been a key
part of litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196462
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196763
involving class claims, under both disparate treatment (patternand-practice) and disparate impact theory. In recent years, the
use of experts has expanded to include stereotyping (in gender,
race and age contexts), employment practices and business
practices generally, and damages, with respect both to economic
loss and mitigation.
This discussion sets forth, via the example of decisions
critical of proposed expert testimony, to identify some of the
practices that counsel should avoid in filing and developing
employment discrimination suits. The illustrations, particularly
since the lessons of Daubert are increasingly being factored in
pretrial strategies, may include the use of experts generally.
In the context of this forum, however, the focus remains
primarily on fact patterns that involve experts whose analyses and
opinions address statistical proof, because the Supreme Court
acknowledged the probative value of such evidence in three
decisions during its 1976 term: Castaneda v. Partida,64
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,65 and
66
Hazelwood School District v. United States.

See Daubert,509 U.S. at 591; O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13
F.3d 1090 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1222 (1994).
62 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)(1)-(17) (1995).
63 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1995).
64 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
61

65431 U.S. 324 (1977).
66 433 U.S. 299, 308, n. 14 (1977).
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Subsequent to those decisions, courts assessed the
admissibility and weight to be accorded to a variety of fact
patterns entailing analytical issues and expert opinion evidence,
such as imprecise and irrelevant statistical comparisons, 67 and the
use of complex statistical techniques going beyond the more basic
difference comparisons covered initially. 68
A. Identifying a Qualified Expert
In In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation,69 the Third Circuit
affirmed the trial court's rejection of a financial analysis expert
under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and Daubert where the
expert's doctoral degree was from a correspondence school,
where the expert had made inconsistent and untruthful statements
in deposition and in voire dire testimony regarding his
credentials, and where his expertise was in a parallel but
dissimilar subfield to the at-issue question. 70 For an expert's
opinion to be reliable and relevant the expert should have
legitimate credentials similar to other job applicants. 71
72
In Gridinich v. Bradlees, the court was dubious of an
expert who claimed to have been retained one hundred times,
deposed fifty times, and testified in twenty cases, where a
Westlaw search revealed only one instance where the expert
testimony was relied on.73
Mancuso v. ConsolidatedEdison Co. of New York 74 covered
the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim after plaintiffs counsel
ignored the trial court's discretionary power to determine
whether the expert's conclusion was supported by relevant

New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 839
F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989).
69 173 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 1999).
70 173 F.3d at 156 (affirming district court's analysis in In re Unisys Savings
Plan Litigation, 21 E.B.C. 2514 (1997)).
67
68

71

id.

72

187 F.R.D. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

71
74

Gridinich, 187 F.R.D. at 80, n.1.

56 F. Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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scientific literature in the field.7 5 The court rejected the
plaintiff's third proposed expert, a medical doctor who was not
qualified in toxicology. 76 The court had previously rejected the
plaintiff's second proposed expert on largely the same grounds,
after the plaintiff's first proposed expert, an "eminent"
toxicologist, failed to support the hypothesis that the plaintiff's
illness was attributable to his employment with the defendant."
Finally, the court, in Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment
Authority, held that a proposed expert who characterized himself
as an "accredited personnel diplomat" and a "certified personal
consultant" was inadmissibly unqualified.78
B. Specifying a Proper Methodology
In Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, a decision issued in
November 1999, the Second Circuit affirmed the summary
dismissal of the plaintiffs claim where the statistical expert
misspecified the regression equations used to determine the
effects of gender and race on the promotion process. 79 The court
held that the plaintiffs expert omitted two major factors that
could possibly have helped account for the observed differences,
hence, the omissions were rendered to be of no probative value
and inadmissible.8 0 Those factors, teaching and university
service, could not be ignored as marginal.8 Where factors are
marginal the report would be admissible, but entitled to reduced
75 Mancuso, 56
76 Id. at 394.

F. Supp. 2d at 392.

at 398.
Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Authority, 844 F. Supp. 1073, 1075
(W.D. Pa.) aff'd., 43 F.3d 1461 (3d Cir. 1994).
79 Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 430 (2d Cir. 1999) cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 2688 (2000). "We thus conclude that, because the
regression analysis failed to account for the major factors that Vassar
considers in evaluating salary increases, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in according the regression analysis probative weight." Id.
'o Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 449 (stating that "Gray's regression analysis,
however, does not even purport to account for two of the major variables teaching and service").
81 Id.
77Id.
78
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weight under Bazemore v. Friday.82 This case represents the
exception to the general principle set forth in Bazemore and holds
instead that when a major factor is omitted the regression is
83
inadmissible.
Additionally, in Raskin v. The Wyatt Co., the Second Circuit
affirmed summary judgment, following exclusion by the trial
court of the plaintiff's economist expert because the expert's
methodology and assumptions were flawed. 84 The expert's
comparison pool looked only at older workers who were not
promoted, and ignored employees who turned
age fifty during the
85
promoted.
were
and
period
time
at-issue
Finally, in Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., the Second
Circuit held that the trial court had abused its discretion in
allowing an expert to testify based on facts that were not
supported by record evidence. 86 The court ruled that experts
should be excluded if their methodological assumptions are "so
unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith," or to be in
essence an "apples and oranges comparison."87
Allard v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. excluded four experts
under Daubert as unreliable and unhelpful to the jury, and under
Evidence Rule 403 as prejudicial. 88 The court was particularly
critical of the plaintiff's counsel for framing the analysis
conducted by one of the economic experts in such a way as to
ignore the possible causes of the disparity in termination rates
other than discr imination, and treated gross termination rate
disparities as discriminatory . 89 The testimony of another expert
was excluded as untrustworthy and inadmissible, given evidence

Id. "Bazemore counseled that 'normally, failure to include variables will
affect the analysis' probativeness, not its admissibility." Id. (quoting
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. at 400).
83 Id.
"[T]here may... be some regressions so incomplete as to be
inadmissible as irrelevant." Id. (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400, n.10).
82

84 125 F.3d 55, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1997).
85
86

Raskin, 125 F.3d at 67.
73 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1996).

87 Boucher, 73
88

F.3d at 21.

1 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907 (S.D. Ind. 1998).

89 Allard,

1 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
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that "he did not actually write the report," 90 and that the opinions
of the other experts
were similar to those already rejected in a
91
companion case.

C. Applying the Methodology Correctly
In Wado v. Xerox Corp., the trial judge did not exclude
plaintiff's statistical expert, but agreed with the defendant's
critique that the expert's methodology was flawed and of no
probative value because the expert's analysis failed to take into

account non-discriminatory job factors such as performance
ratings. 92 The expert failed to control for performance rates
(which he assumed were manipulated to disadvantage older

workers),

thereby eliminating

plaintiff's

ability to detect

disparities arising from the application of facially-neutral job
93
practices.

Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc. illustrated that an
expert's flawed assumptions and methodology were neither

admissible nor satisfactory to forestall summary judgment. 94 A
statistician, unqualified to address whether the at-issue pool of
employees in dissimilar jobs were fungible for comparing
terminations on the basis of age, simply assumed that they
were. 95
Also, by omitting other potentially explanatory
variables, the expert gave up the opportunity to test alternative,
age-neutral
hypotheses regarding the employer's termination
96
pattern.
90 Id.
at

904.

9'Id. at 905.

92 991 F. Supp. 174, 184 (1998), af'd, Smith v. Xerox Corp. 196 F.3d 358
(2d Cir. 1999).
93 Wado, 991 F. Supp. at 184. See also, Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp.
1157, 1167 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing plaintiff's case where the expert's
opinion was entitled to no weight because she deliberately omitted, rather than
controlled for, data she believed to reflect defendant bias).
94 Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997).
95 Id. at 942. "The expert's failure to make adjustments for variables bearing
on the decision whether to discharge or retain a person on the list other than
age ...indicates a failure to exercise the degree of care that a statistician
would
96 Id.use in his scientific work .... " Id.
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Further, in Camp v. Lockheed Martin Corp., an expert
industrial psychologist's opinion that age stereotypes affected the
defendant's decisionmaking was stricken, because the expert
selectively relied on his prior research results that supported
plaintiff's position, ignoring his own disclaimer about
generalizing findings from one study to another,
and his findings
"which contradict[ed] the desired conclusion." 97
Finally, in EEOC v. Rockwell, the trial court excluded the
opinion of plaintiff's vocational rehabilitation expert on several
grounds, including reliance on "facts and data which no expert in
his field, or any other, including himself, would rely," 9 and the
expert's admission at the Dauberthearing that his Rule 26 report
contained textual language and a chart supplied by counsel. 99
IV. CONCLUSION
Subsequent to Daubert but prior to Joiner or Kunho, the
Second Circuit, in McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co.,' 00 held that the
gatekeeper should focus on an expert's methodology, and not the
substantive opinion based on that methodology. 0 1 The court
rejected the defendant's contention that the trial judge should
have excluded plaintiff's medical expert, holding that such an
exclusion would 1 0have
been "an unwarranted expansion of the
2
role."
gatekeeper
That aspect of McCullock, and similar reasoning in In re
Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation,103 appear
to be inconsistent with Kuhmo, extending the gatekeeper's role to
all elements of an expert's opinion - the methodology and the

Camp v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 74 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 45713 (S.D.
Tx. 1998).
98 EEOC v. Rockwell, Int'l Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (N.D. I11.), r'hg.
denied, 1999 WL 1252542 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
97

99 Id.

'00

61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995).

1o0McCullock,

61 F.3d at 1044.
at 1043.
103 52 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995).
10 2 Id.
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results."14 Similarly, the decision in Stagl v. Delta Airlines,
Inc.,'05 that it was an abuse of discretion by the trial court to
exclude an otherwise qualified expert (on the basis of education
and general experience) whose expertise "was insufficiently
tailored to the facts" of the case, 06 cannot easily be reconciled
with Kumho and the further expansion of gatekeeper discretion
that decision represents.
Raskin, and most recently Turrentine, suggest that the
requirement that experts not only be qualified, but also establish
that their methodology is reliable, as a prerequisite to
admissibility, is now clear.
With respect to experts in
employment discrimination cases, the two lines of legal analyses
controlling the admissibility of their opinions continue to
converge. That is, comparisons that are insufficiently refined
will not satisfy Title VII or ADEA standards as to substance, and
gatekeeper scrutiny on evidentiary and procedural grounds
promises to eliminate 10at7 least those most blatantly unqualified to
offer expert opinions.
The force of this convergence is likely to become more
pronounced in coming years, as the full effects of the evidence
trilogy become widely understood. The use of experts in
employment discrimination cases, like all other civil litigation,
will proceed accordingly.

In re Joint Easter and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 52 F.2d at
1133; McCullock, 61 F.3d at 1042.
'os 117 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1996).
'06 Stagl, 117 F.3d at 82.
107 See Wooley v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d. 703, 706
(S.D. Tx. 1999) (excluding as "bad science and junk medicine" a physician
whose opinion had already been excluded by at least ten courts in related
cases).
'04
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